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VIRGINIA SECTION 
THE NOTICE OF MOTION AND MODERN PROCEDURAL 
REFORM 
Introduction 
FOR a number of years Virginia has been experimenting to see what preference would be shown if attorneys were given a choice 
between pleading their cases according to the common law or ac-
cording to the modern device called notice of motion procedure. 
The rapidity with which the bar of this state has discarded the 
common law declaration and has switched completely to the simple 
motion procedure augurs well for the favorable reception. of other 
procedural reforms which have been developed and tested in the 
federal courts and in the courts of sister states. It should also en-
courage the courts of Virginia to give interpretations of the statute 
creating this procedure which will carry out the objects intended 
to be accomplished by its enactment. 
The notice of motion procedure emphasizes the pleading of the 
facts upon which the plaintiff claims relief, and relieves the plaintiff 
of the necessity which existed at common law of confining himself 
at his peril to one single certain legal theory or issue.I This change 
requires a corresponding change in principles for determining what 
claims must be joined or lost, what claims may either be joined or 
properly left for separate suit, and the joinder of defendants. It 
also suggests the need for statutes p~tting broad pleading of 
claims of the defendant and a blending of equity and law procedure. 
The concepts limiting the plaintiff in stating his facts should be 
those adapted to the needs of the motion procedure, not those 
derived from the superseded common law system.2 Some of the 
I. Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 MrcH. L. REv. 257 (1943) • In this 
article a distinction is drawn between the minimum scope (content) of a civil 
action at common law which was determined by the original writs and the 
maximum scope (outer boundary) of a civil action which was determined by 
five unrelated principles one of which was that the case before trial had to be 
reduced to a single issue of law or fact. 
2. It is stated in footnote 5 of CLARK, HANDBOOK ON CODE PLEADING 436 (2d ed. 
1947) , "Of course, the extent of the subject-matter of a single case was limited 
at common law; but it was done by the formulary system, and the use of the 
cause of action as a unit of measurement is a device of the code, developed large-
ly from equity procedure." 
1949] VIRGINIA SECTION-NOTE 381 
Virginia decisions overlooking this fact have continued to use com-
mon law rules thereby circumscribing in many ways the broad 
scope a case should have if the motion procedure were interpreted 
according to code pleading principles. To use the common law 
as a sine qua non for the interpretation of the motion device is to 
restrict the very liberality in pleading which this procedure is in-
tended to provide. It results in the substitution of technicality for 
justice in a great many cases and introduces in another form the 
outworn distinctions of the formulary system.3 
The Joinder of Related Claims 
In a recent case, Felvey v. Shaffer,4 the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia set forth a rule which permits a plaintiff in a limited 
class of cases to go far in pleading his facts as facts without classifi-
cation of them into counts according to the legal theories involved. 
In his notice of motion the plaintiff set out in separate paragraphs, 
but not in separately numbered counts, a claim against the de-
fendant under the insulting words statute and a claim for assault 
and battery occurring at the same time. The defendant contended 
the notice of motion was fatally defective for duplicity and moved 
the court to require i:he plaintiff to elect on which action he would 
proceed. The trial court overruled this motion as well as a motion 
to strike evidence of the assault. The Supreme Court of Appeals 
affirmed the case holding that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff 
in stating his case to separate allegations of insulting words from 
those relating to assault and battery. This could be interpreted to 
mean that the court considered there was but one broad cause of 
action in such case with the plaintiff seeking relief by way of several 
3. This principle was enunciated long ago in the FIRST REPoRT OF HER MAJ-
ESTY's COMMISSIONERS FOR INQUIRING INTO THE PROCESS, PRACTICE, AND SYSTEM 
OF PLEADING IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF COMMON LAw 32 (1851) i "The principal 
objection that has been urged against any alteration in this respect is, that by 
abolishing forms of action causes of action would become less clearly defined 
• • •. No merit of distinctness as to causes of action can be attributed to 
present forms; • • •. It is manifest, therefore, that as the question, whether there 
is a cause of action or not, must depend upon the facts and not upon the form 
adopted, the decision of a cause on the merits is not helped by means of these 
forms of action." 
4. 186 Va. 419, 42 S. E. 2d 860 (1947) • 
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legal theories.5 However it is clear from the rest of the opinion that 
the court was unwilling to extend its holding this far. Although 
allowing the statement to be in composite form the court shifts 
back to the idea of two causes of action, saying, "In the case before 
us the two causes of action, one for insulting words and the other 
for assault and· battery, both sound in tort, are closely related and 
arise out of the same incident. They should have been the basis of a 
single suit."6 Did the Court mean "required" to be determined in 
a single suit? There is nothing in the notice of motion procedure to 
prevent such a holding and a great deal of modern thought would 
dictate this as an appropriate result to prevent multiplicity of suits 
and unfair advantage to the plaintiff in permitting piecemeal treat-
ment of a problem which should by reason of the relationship of 
the facts giving rise to it form a unit for purposes of legal treat-
ment.7 The possibility of what is essentially a double recovery is 
apparent no matter how we may try to enmesh the problem with 
procedural niceties concerning causes of action or forms of action. 
It may even be the subject of debate whether two satisfactions would 
have been allowed at common law under such circumstances al-
though it is frequently stated that since two forms of action would 
be involved this would be the case.8 
The real difficulty with the above decision is caused by the 
failure of the court to overrule its earlier holding in Bowles v. May.9 
The notice of motion in that case was a "conglomerate" allegation 
of trespass, assault, slander and insulting words combined in a 
single count, and the court upheld a demurrer for misjoinder of 
causes of action. In distinguishing it from the Felvey case the court 
said, "the real defect in the pleading for which we thought the 
demurrer should have been sustained, was its failure to state a 
cause of action 'with reasonable precision'."10 The plaintiff's re-
5. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 454. The author points out that the cases 
fall into three groups. Under the first the assault and slander would give 
rise to distinct causes of action not arising out of the same transaction and not 
joinable. Under the second there would be different causes of action joinable 
as rising out of the same transaction. Under the third there would be 
a single cause of action. He says that courts in the same jurisdiction will vary 
between the second and third interpretations. ' 
6. 186 Va. 419, 424, 42 S. E. 2d 860, 862 (1947). 
7. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 455. 
8. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 474. But see BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
§ 143 (3d ed. 1934) where the general conception is stated. 
9. 159 Va. 419, 166 S. E. 550 (1932). 
10. 186 Va. 419, 424, 42 S. E. 2d 860, 862 (1947) • 
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liance in the Bowles case on several legal theories, instead of one, 
for a recovery is the only apparent reason for any lack of precision 
in the notice of motion. The number of possible theories created 
a confusion of issues which was unacceptable to the court. This is 
made clear in the Bowles case where the court says, "The defendant 
was unnecessarily handicapped, in pleading to the notice, in ascer-
taining the real basis of the plaintiff's cause of action, and in making 
preparation fQr his defense."ll From this standpoint the Felvey 
case could now be said to stand for the proposition that a con-
glomerate statement which only combines two legal theories as a 
basis for a recovery will be permitted. Actually the' approach in 
the Felvey case is modern, based on pleading the facts, while that 
in the Bowles case is antiquated, harking back to the common law 
ideal of a single certain issue. The following quotation from the 
Bowles case makes this very clear, "The object of all pleading is 
the production of an issue, and, when it is one of fact, to confine 
the introduction of evidence to the relevancy of the issue thus made, 
so that there will be no confusion in the minds of the jury as to 
the question to be decided."12 It is interesting to notice that the 
court found the issues sufficiently formed to hold for the defendant 
that there was no ground for recovery on the evidence. If the issues 
were sufficiently formed for the adequate development of the evi-
dence for this purpose, they were sufficiently formed for the notice 
to have been sustained for all purposes. 
The Joinder of Contract and Tort Claims 
For the purpose of the case before it, the court in the Felvey 
case correctly substituted the rationale of notice to the defendant 
and trial convenience for the restricted view of the Bowles case 
which would concern itself with the technicalities of issues as they 
were formed at common law. Unfortunately the court is unwilling 
to give complete adherence in all classes of cases to the principle 
which it uses. Broad notice pleading is allowed "because both causes 
of action sound in tort." If one had sounded in contract and the 
other in tort, the court would have applied the common law rule 
requiring an election. This retention of the common law tort-con-
tract dichotomy seems unfortunate. If the two claims are sufficiently 
related that it is convenient for them to be tried in the same case, 
11. 159 Va. 419, 423, 166 S. E. 550, 551 (1932) . 
12. Ibid. 
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and if the pleading gives the defendant adequate factual notice of 
the nature of the claims against him, the plaintiff's pleading should 
be allowed to stand even though at common law the plaintiff would 
have had to choose at his peril whether he could prove his case in 
contract or tort. 
The case of Kavanaugh v. Donovan13 furnishes a graphic example 
of the unfairness which results when this common law rule is 
applied to the notice of motion procedure. There an action at law 
was brought against a tenant for waste, the plaintiff landlord pro-
ceeding by notice of motion founded both upon contract and tort. 
The contract claim was based upon an oral agreement to execute 
a written lease requiring the tenant to make necessary repairs. The 
defendant went into occupancy, which continued three and one-
half years, without signing the lease because he desired a clause 
releasing him in case his business of rendering dead animals was 
enjoined. The tort claim was based upon negligence of the de-
fendant and upon wanton waste under section 5509 of the Virginia 
Code permitting double damages in wanton waste. The defendant's 
demurrer for misjoinder of causes of action was sustained, and the 
plaintiff elected to proceed in tort. Nevertheless, the trial court 
admitted the unexecuted lease in evidence to show the relationship 
of the parties. It also instructed the jury that the defendant was to 
use ordinary care and was to return the premises at the end of the 
lease in substantially· the same condition as he found them. The 
Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly re-
quired the election, but then by admitting the lease to show relation-
ship (which was already admitted and also shown by the long oc-
cupancy) and by the instruction, erroneously allowed the plaintiff 
to proceed on both causes of action as though no election had been 
required. 
In arriving at its conclusion the court relies almost exclusively 
upon Burks, Pleading and Practice.I4 The court interprets this 
author as follows, "It is elementary that causes of action in tort 
and contract should not be joined in the same notice of motion or 
declaration."15 It is submitted that the court should not have 
adopted this restrictive common law rule under the notice of 
motion procedure without any consideration of the necessity or 
desirability of its application to that procedure or to the facts of 
13. 186 Va. 85, 41 S. E. 2d 489 (1947) • 
14. § 99 (3d ed. 1934) • 
15. 186 Va. 85, 93, 41 S. E. 2d 489, 493 (1947) • 
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the particular case. There is no direct reference in Burk's work 
which justifies the conclusion that the principle against joining 
causes of action in tort with causes of action in contract applies to 
the notice of motion procedure. The fact that the section in that 
work purports to be dealing with the common law action of as-
sumpsit and reads solely with reference to the declaration would 
seem to limit the discussion in that section to the common law 
action of assumpsit only. This view is strengthened by reference 
to another section of Burks, Pleading and Practice, which reads, 
"The procedure by motion (after notice) for a judgment is practi-
cally what is known as 'code pleading' plain and simple, and is 
destitute of the formalities usual in common-law actions.'•16 Many 
leading cases in states where code pleading is used dispense with the 
common law distinction which prevented the joinder of claims in 
tort and contract.I7 
Where a plaintiff cannot tell in advance what the development 
of his evidence will be, it seems unfair to require him at his peril 
to choose a single legal theory for his case. I£ he could have re-
covered had he chosen the right theory, the substantive law gives 
him a right which the law of procedure denies him. Frequently it 
will be at best merely a good guess as to the proper way to frame the 
action. There is no reason under the notice of motion procedure 
or under the codes why he cannot state the entire transaction 
factually in one count, or if desired in two or more counts. The 
court exercising its administrative function can see that only those 
issues upon which sufficient evidence has been offered are submitted 
to the jury.18 
The application by the Virginia Courts of the rule requiring an 
election between contract and tort causes particular hardship in 
cases of sales of food containing deleterious substances.I9 The 
16. § 173 (3d eel. 1934). 
17. Sundeeland, joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REv. 571, 576 (1920). 
18. "One of the unfortunate consequences of the close historical connection 
between rights and remedies, is the inveterate tendency of lawyers and judges 
to accord to the rules relating to each the same protection and the same measure 
of professional homage." Sunderland, supra note 17, at 571. 
19. The requirement of an election is set forth emphatically in Blythe v. Camp 
Mfg. Co., 183 Va. 432, 32 S. E. 2d 659 (1945) ; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. 
v. Dunn, 181 Va. 390, 25 S. E. 2d 254 (1943) ; Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 
166 Va. 314, 186 S. E. 94 (1936) . There was even doubt in Virginia under the 
old procedure whether breach of warranty was properly classified as a contract 
action. Certainly the early case of Birmingham v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 98 
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plaintiff in preparing the case frequently will be unable to de-
termine in advance of proof which theory his evidence will sustain. 
In view of the confused state of the law on the subject he will also 
have difficulty in determining what construction of the law the 
court is likely to adopt. Without unduly prejudicing a defendant 
the plaintiff should be able to state his facts in terms of a recovery 
for breach of warranty, for negligence and for negligence per se 
for violation of a pure food statute, and recover on the basis of 
the facts which he is able to prove. This enlargement of the case is 
no more than he is entitled to under the applicable substantive 
law. The fact that the Virginia courts are unwilling to adopt the 
modern view making a seller of goods virtually an insurer of the 
edibility of the food he sells by extending the warranty made on 
the sale to persons likely to be injured from eating the food, makes 
it especially important not to place a handicap on the plaintiff 
requiring him to frame his case so narrowly that he often pleads 
himself out of court. 
Determining the Scope of a Case 
If the approach is one of freely determining under a new pro-
cedure a sensible factual unit for consideration of the tribunal in 
a single case, it is much more likely that a common sense determina-
tion can be made of such questions as how much must and how 
much can a plaintiff bring into a single case or action, how far the 
entire matter is res judicata where a part has already been de-
termined, etc. 
In this connection it may be asked, "Can you bring an action for 
defamation: under the insulting words statute, then later an action 
for common law slander and recover in both?" Suppose the first 
action fails, can you maintain the second action? While there is 
no duplicity in stating the two courts in one action, apparently the 
courts would refuse to grant two separate recoveries. In W. T. Grant 
Co. v. Owens20 the court holds the action for insulting words is 
Va. 548, 37 S. E. 17 (1900), holds that the proper statute of limitations is not 
determined by the form of action but by its object. The court says if the thing 
complained of is an injury to the person, the limitation in assumpsit is the same 
as if the action were in form, ex delicto. This case, however, is overlooked in 
Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., supra, which holds that limitation in contract 
actions is the one properly applicable to the case where personal injury results 
from eating bad food. 
20. 149 Va. 906, 141 S. E. 860 (1928). 
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treated entirely as an action for libel or slander for words actionable 
per se, except (now removed from the statute) "no demurrer shall 
preclude a jury passing thereon", and no publication of the words 
is necessary. It is further held, "In fact the trial of an action for in-
sulting words is completely assimilated to the common law action 
for libel or slander, and from the standpoint of the Virginia law is 
an action for libel or slander."21 This must mean that the plaintiff 
has but one cause of action but can state his case in terms of two 
legal theories and recover upon the one proved. If this is the correct 
interpretation, it seems an eminently sound decision and one which 
develops a theory also useful where a single transaction or oc-
currence may involve legal theories more definitely separable than 
insulting words and slander, i.e.~ assault and battery and insulting 
words where related to the same transaction, as in the Felvey case. 
It is certainly preferable to a recent West Virginia case where the 
court allowed itself to become hopelessly involved in trying to 
separate an issue of assault and battery from malpractice in an 
action against a dentist.22 However it is reasonably certain that the 
courts in Virginia would not at this time go so far as to hold that 
only one cause of action is involved in many of these situations.23 
The Joinder of Defendants 
The scope of a case which should be treated as a unit can be 
narrowed by the application of restrictive rules relating to the 
joinder of defendants. Recognizing this, the code systems adopt a 
broader joinder of parties defendant than was permitted at common 
law. Since some change of the common law rule is an integral part 
of all code pleading it is proper to conclude that reform was in-
21. Id. at 914, 141 S. E. at 863. 
22. Wellman v. Drake, 43 S. E. 2d 57 (yi. Va. 1947). 
23. In Cohen v. Power, 183 Va. 258, 32 S. E. 2d 64 (1944) , the plaintiff was 
hired as a traveling companion of the defendant. When defendant thought 
plaintiff had stolen jewelry she was discharged and denied access to her baggage, 
and the plaintiff brought detinue for its return. Before recovery it was returned 
to her and the action dismissed. Plaintiff then brought an action for breach of 
contract of employment and recovered. Lastly, she brought an action for common 
law defamation and for insulting words under the statute. Defendant contended 
that all matters in the courts for defamation had been adjudicated in the action 
of detinue and in the action for breach of contract. The Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia held that the plaiutiff could maintain the action for defama-
tion and insulting words applying the narrow test, "would the same facts or 
evidence sustain both actions." 
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tended in this respect when the notice of motion procedure was 
adopted in Virginia. Instead, the Supreme Court of Appeals has 
adopted the strict common law rules which have little in common 
with the purpose of motion procedure and result in the unnecessary 
reversal of decisions on technicalities. 
A recent case demonstrates the waste of time and human effort 
which occurs when that which is one from a factual or transaction 
standpoint is split asunder by the use of common law rules relating 
to joinder of defendants and causes of action. In Norfolk Union 
Bus Terminal~ Inc. v. Sheldon,24 the plaintiff sued the Terminal 
Company and its servant Webb (who was also a conservator of the 
peace) for malicious prosecution arising out of allegedly false 
charges filed by Webb, 1. that the plaintiff had operated his auto-
mobile without a license, and 2. that plaintiff had trespassed on the 
defendant Terminal Company's property. The trial court ruled 
that the Terminal Company was not liable for charging the plaintiff 
with operating the car without a license since its servant Webb was 
acting in the discharge of his public duties in making the charge. 
It, however, refused to require the plaintiff to elect which defendant 
he would proceed against. At the trial the plaintiff was permitted 
to amend his notice of motion to charge the defendants with ob-
taining warrants, instead of a warrant, for his arrest on the above 
charges. It was argued by the Terminal Company that the amend-
ment resulted in a fatal misjoinder of causes of action since the 
Terminal Company was not liable on the cause of action for charg-
ing the plaintiff with operating without a license. The Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that in actions against several 
parties, whether ex contractu or ex delicto~ all the causes of action 
must be stated to be joint. Counts against the parties jointly and 
counts against them severally cannot be joined. When it developed 
that the plaintiff's causes of action were not the same as to both 
defendants, the plaintiff should have been required to elect as to 
which cause of action he would pursue. 
The court refused to pass on the question of whether the plaintiff 
might properly maintain a joint action against the two defendants 
for damages arising out of the prosecution under the trespass 
warrant with the right to recover compensatory damages against 
the defendant Terminai Company and both compensatory and 
24. 49 S. E. 2d 338 (Va. 1948) • 
1949] VIRGINIA SECTION-NOTE 389 
punitive damages against Webb.25 It would indeed be a refinement 
of the applicable principles to hold that the difference in measure 
of damages required the severance of an otherwise joint action, but 
it shows the ridiculous extreme to which the court might be willing 
to go to narrow the issues of a case. 
A decision such as that in the Norfolk Union Bus Terminal, Inc. 
case would not occur in a modern pleading state nor would it oc-
cur under the Federal Rules26 which permit a plaintiff to join 
persons as defendants, "if there is asserted against them jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of trans-
actions or occurrences if any question of law or fact common to all 
of them will arise in the action." 
The result of the Virginia decision is that master and servant 
can be sued jointly where they are charged with a joint tort, but 
where the plaintiff attempts to combine in addition a related claim 
against the servant alone as to which the master is not liable, the 
plaintiff will be required to elect for misjoinder of causes of 
action. This limitation of the scope of the case can only be under-
stood as an application of common law principles to the notice of 
motion procedure. It is one of the purposes of this procedure to 
avoid just such limitations and to have courts treat problems as a 
whole, not piecemeal. 
Set Off and Recoupment and the Scope of a Case 
The Virginia statutes on set off and recoupment do not permit 
sufficient development of the claims of the defendant, related and 
otherwise, which can be conveniently handled in the same case as 
the primary claim. While there are Virginia cases recognizing the 
necessity of preventing a multiplicity of suits by allowing rather 
extreme interpretations of the present statutes, the court in Odessky 
v. Monterey Wine Company, Inc.Zl refuses to go the whole way 
by the process of judicial legislation. In this case the court refused 
to permit a defendant, sued for the purchase price of one lot of 
wine, to plead by way of set off a claim for breach of warranty of 
25. What rule would the court feel compelled to apply, in view of the restric-
tive views shown in the cases cited, where a party has alleged two counts, one 
for a wilful act, one for negligence? Strict adherence to a theory of pleading as de-
veloped in Virginia would require an election, but this seems ridiculous. 
26. FED. R. CIV. P., 20 (a). 
Z!. 49 S. E. 2d 330 (Va. 1948). 
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quality and alcoholic content in the purchase of an earlier lot of 
wine which the defendant had already paid for. The court con-
sidered the clai~ miliquidated and not arising out of the contract 
sued on. The court limited recoupment under Virginia Code section 
6145 to cases where the claim sought to be settled grows out of the 
contract sued on, and limited set off under Virginia Code section 
6144 to cases where the subject of set off is a liquidated demand. In 
reaching this result the court finds that the cases defining "liqui-
dated" are unsatisfactory. "The confusion arises in Virginia from 
an effort to give the statute a liberal interpretation for the purpose 
of preventing a multiplicity of suits **"" ."28 The Legislature should 
change the statutes so that the courts do not have to strain and will 
not fail to reach the result which they recognize as the only rational 
one. 
Extension of Notice of Motion Procedure to Equity 
With the adoption of code pleading, states abolished the pro-
cedural distinctions between cases at law and those in equity and 
substituted one form of action for both. When the change first 
appeared in the code pleading states some courts were reluctant to 
hold that the plaintiff could recover on the facts he pleaded and 
required a statement of fact in terms of either a legal or equitable 
claim. In Simpson v. Bantley,29 objection was made that no cause 
of action was stated in conversion but that the plaintiff had only an 
equitable interest in the property. The court held there was but 
one form of action and if the facts showed any rights of recovery 
the petition must be held good, whether called an action at law 
for conversion, for breach of contract for failing to comply with 
the terms of the mortgage, or an action in equity. Thus the full ef-
fect of notice pleading is now being realized and is being utilized 
to avoid the technicalities incident to the use of other theories 
attempting to limit the scope of cases too drastically at the pleading 
stage. The distinguished committee drafting the new federal rules 
of civil procedure recognizing how well one form of civil action has 
worked in practice have incorporated it into the Federal Rules. 
The enlightened and sensible decision of the court in Carr v. 
Union Church of Hopewell30 has laid the groundwork in Virginia 
28. Id. at 332. 
29. 142 Mo. App. 490, 126 S. W. 999 (1910). 
30. 186 Va. 411, 82 S. E. 2d 840 (1947) . 
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for the adoption of one form of civil action combining law and 
equity procedure into a single system of pleading. In that case the 
question was raised as to which set of statutes, those relating to 
appeal or to error proceedings, applied to a declaratory judgment 
action. In a moment of inspiration the Court said, "Under our 
statutes (6140a et seq.) there is no separation of law from equity. 
The court may enter an order, judgment or decree, and the losing 
party may apply for a writ of error or an appeal. The procedure 
may be either on the law side or the equity side. We should not be 
too meticulous about separating law from equity under this pro-
cedure. Even if a case has been treated as one at law when in strict-
ness it should have been treated as in equity, or vice versa, the 
court, when proper and if necessary, would transfer it from one side 
to the other under Code, sec. 6084 (Michie, 1942) . But we do not 
think it was necessary in this case to transfer it to the equity side. 
If a case be brought properly under our declaratory judgment 
statute, it makes no difference on which side of the court it pro-
ceeds."31 
This decision demonstrates that a blending of law and equity 
procedure does not present any great obstacles where the declaratory 
judgments procedure is used. Since the mere fact that a declaration 
is sought does not change the essential nature of most cases, as 
being at law or in equity, and since this procedure can be used· 
in almost every class of case, the decision stands as a reminder to 
the bar that the difficulties of blending equity and law procedure 
are mostly imaginary and do not disturb the highest court of this 
state. 
Conclusion 
There is a great deal of discussion going on in Virginia as to the 
advisability of adopting the federal rules of procedure as the rules 
of procedure for the state courts. Several states have done so, and 
their experience indicates that the rules form a very sattsfactory 
basis for state procedure. Most of the difficulties discussed in this 
article would be avoided if this were done. More thought and work 
has been given to the problems of procedure by the federal com-
mittee than can ever be accomplished by a state committee however 
careful and worthwhile its work may be. It is important to observe, 
too, that whatever changes in Virginia procedure are made there 
will follow the costly interpretation which necessarily accompanies 
31. Id. at 417, 42 S. E. 2d at 843. 
